economy" can be understood separately from that which gets labelled as "non-economic" and, therefore, marginal, is problematic. It is not merely that "economies" have "social, political and moral conditions and consequences" (Clarke 2014a, 108) but, rather, they have to be situated within what Mitchell Dean has termed "an analytics of government" (Dean 1999, 23) working to produce "vocabularies and procedures for the production of truth", made up of specific kinds of "practical rationality", framed as "expertise" and "know-how" (Dean 1999, 23) , in which the social dimensions of knowledge are dismissed entirely or reconfigured as if they were merely "matters of individual market choice" based on the sum of "individual preferences" (Sayer 2004, 4) .
For Sayer, then, analytically, all economies are "moral economies" and, normatively speaking, the key question becomes "what are (such) economies for?" (Sayer 2000, 94, our addition) . Norms of justice, rights, entitlements and ethical behaviour exist alongside, but are frequently overridden or instrumentalised by, considerations of profit, as entrenched power relations gain a spurious kind of legitimacy. Following in the tradition of E. P. Thompson (1971) , Sayer asserts that "the study of moral economy involves an evaluation of economic systems, actions and motives in terms of their effects on people's lives" (Sayer 2000, 80) , in which, as Sen's "capabilities approach" draws attention to (Sen 1999) , "not just anything can be passed off as flourishing" (Sayer 2007, 268) . Recently, again through important re-readings of Thompson and James C. Scott (1976) , Palomera and Vetta (2016) have stressed the materiality of "moral economies", suggesting that "the structural inequalities generated by particular forms of capital accumulation -mediated by particular kinds of state regulation -are always metabolised through particular fields constituted by dynamic combinations of norms, meanings and practices" (Palomera and Vetta 2016, 414) . A crucial task of critical social science becomes one of rendering as questionable the taken-for-granted assumptions that legitimise practices, institutions and effects located in the assemblage of "the economy".
It is precisely the flexible and shifting nature of economic expertise which makes the task all the more difficult. The creation of new forms of expertise alongside more traditional forms and incorporating "all those knowledges which have evaded capitalism until now" (Thrift 2005, 6) , contributes to this process of making the target even more mobile and fuzzy. New assemblages of economic expertise involve "capitalizing the world down to the last millisecond and millimetre" (Thrift 2005, 10) , "harnessing tacit knowledge", producing reflexive "communities of practice" and even, "working with and making more of affect" (Thrift 2005, 97) . At the same time, as Clarke has argued, it is important to understand the present conjuncture as "characterised by traces of heterogeneous imagined moral economies, in which different fractures of obligation, interdependence and mutual imbrication have been named" Clarke 2014a, 108), offering "threads of possibility that emerge at the point of imagining the economic, the social and the political differently" (Clarke 2014a, 110) . Thinking, and acting, "otherwise" (Clarke et al. 2015 ; ch. 7) involves both a critique of "economic thinking" of all kinds and, crucially, an exploration of critical ways of "thinking about economics".
Re-imagining expertise
Imagining the economic differently, however, is not possible without imagining economic expertise differently. As Doreen Massey (2013) has pointed out, the hegemony of economics relies on a specific vocabulary "of customer, consumer, choice, markets and selfinterest (which) moulds both our conception of ourselves and our understanding of and relationship to the world" (Massey 2013, 5) . The hegemonic work of removing "the economic" from the sphere of "political and ideological contestation" (Massey 2013, 16 ) is far from accidental, and requires us to analyse and critique the power of economic expertise. Claims to expertise are, of course, only partially determined and constrained by the response of diverse "publics" and the rational interrogation of the legitimacy of knowledge. As St. Clair (2006) reminds us, there is often a circularity of legitimacy insofar as "experts seek legitimacy of their knowledge claims among audiences that have either been created by or are dependent on the same experts that seek legitimacy in the first place" (St. Clair 2006, 59) . The position of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as "transnational expertise institutions" relies not only on the power of a particular reading of economics but, also, on their ability to use "fact-surrogates", nothing more nor less than "well-structured parts of an ill-structured and complex whole" (St. Clair 2006, 59) , reliant on economics' core cognitive values including quantification, simplification and measurability. A consensus amongst a particular "epistemic community" of scientists (cf. Deacon, Hulse, and Stubbs 1997) , then, is not, in any sense, a "scientific consensus" (St. Clair 2006, 60) , however much it may appear to be so.
Understanding that claims to "expertise" constitute "an essential element of politics" (Pfister and Horvath 2014, 313 ) allows for a focus on "multiple plays of making, questioning, contesting and remaking knowledge and power" (Pfister and Horvath 2014, 315) . As Newman and Clarke (this volume) show, the boundaries between "experts" and "nonexperts", as well as the value of "expertise" per se, are "regularly contested and reimagined" (Pfister and Horvath 2014, 312) . As Holmes and Marcus (2005) have argued, the idea that power has been transferred to "the market" often forgets that markets are "peopled", by the central bank officials they study but, also, by management consultants, economic and financial advisors, economic forecasters, the staff of ratings' agencies, and many others. These "experts" rarely rely on the methods of statistical analysis and the modalities of econometrics alone, however. As Holmes and Marcus remind us, central bankers may base their judgements and forecasts on what, at first sight, may appear as unscientific registers of "the anecdote", "gut feelings" and such like, actually incorporating "a politics of experience", a "sense of where the economy is going" based as much on how informants react and what they do not say as on what they do say.
As Aihwa Ong recognises, within what is generally referred to as "globalization", systems that "mix technology, politics and actors" (Ong 2006, 338) rather than maintaining clear boundaries between them, and breaking free of, rather than being shackled by, spatial constraints, become the new norm, forming new "ecologies of belonging", albeit in a contradictory "war of position" with nation state identifications. As Hurl (this volume) demonstrates, it is within the global city that the complex power interplay of global, national and local becomes visible, as local states sub-contract elements of governance to transnational consultancy firms able to frame their interventions through the apparent legitimacy of welltravelled diagnostic "tools". Although one part of the claim to "expertise" within such a "toolkit" approach to public policy challenges rests on the "innovative" nature of the technologies being utilised, the ability of some of the oldest professions, including lawyers and accountants (cf. Carter and Warren, this volume), to remain "relevant" in "new times" relies on a hybrid sense of mixing "traditional" and "new" forms of expertise.
The studies presented here address the role of expertised actors, institutions and models in connecting universalising, "travelling", or "fast" policies (Peck and Theodore 2015) with conjuncturally specific renderings of "techno-managerial control" in situ (cf. Stubbs, this volume). In a sense both a faith in "expertise" and the assertion of its opposite, a kind of "populist" debunking of expert claims, come together in what Swyngedouw has termed "the debris of consensual autocratic post-democracy" (Swyngedouw 2017a, 54) .
The "post-politicizing" rituals of neoliberal "good governance" combine, then, "a politicization of 'the economy' with an economization of 'politics' under the aegis of a naturalized market-based configuration of the production and distribution of goods and services" (Swyngedouw 2017a, 54) . The articles in this collection show, in their different ways, the role of "expertise" in "the institutionalisation of post-democratic regimes of governance, articulated around rendering governing to a techno-managerial and biopolitical practice of arranging life without changing the common sense and everyday routines of the existing socio-political configuration and its constitutive power relations" (Swyngedouw 2017b, 57) .
What is to count as valuable expertise differs, of course, in different phases of capitalism (Stubbs, this volume) , with the phase of "financialization" invoking knowledges, modes of thinking, norms and institutions which threaten notions of the economy as "self-contained" or "self-regulated" (Clarke 2014a, 108) . As Maesse (this volume) shows, the multiplication of economic expert cultures in play in the current conjuncture, operating according to different "positioning logics", does not in and of itself threaten the hegemony of "the economic" per se. As Sayer has argued, economic expertise continues to treat financialization as merely "another phenomenon to document" (Sayer 2007, 268) , albeit leading to heated debates at the margins. The uneven and contradictory integration of ordinary people into financial networks, then, also creates the need for an expansion of the economic into the realm of everyday life, including a foray into behavioural and psychological realms, precisely concerned with the moulding of financially literate, self-managing, and responsibilised subjects (Žitko, this volume).
Re-framing austerity
Understanding "austerity" as "an assemblage of economic and moral imaginings" (Clarke 2014b, 20) focuses attention on the "shape changing ideological work" (Clarke and Newman 2012, 300) , likened to a kind of "alchemy", an investment in magical beliefs, which has attempted, not without success, to re-define the global financial crisis beginning in 2007-8 into a supposed "fiscal crisis". Whilst the European Commission may have preferred the term "fiscal consolidation" to "austerity" (Stubbs and Lendvai 2016, 31) , the massive sleight of hand involved in securing a degree of consent for the view that, through the restoration of "business confidence" (cf. Blyth 2013), cuts in "unproductive" state expenditures, which had "crowded out" productive private spending, would lead to the holy grail of sustained economic growth after "everyone has made the necessary sacrifices", required a monumental effort of reframing.
"Austerity is not working" became an ever more plausible chant of resistance both at the level of macro-political economy as debt reduction targets became ever harder to achieve (see Maesse and Stubbs, this volume) , and at the level of everyday life as, patently, housing repossessions, mass unemployment, precarious employment and the spread of inwork poverty called into question the myth of "shared sacrifice" and "collective responsibility" (Clarke and Newman 2012) . Although here is not the place to argue whether the lasting political legacies of austerity will turn out to be the Occupy movement or Brexit and Trump, Clarke and Newman (this volume) are clearly right to assert a lineage between "top down austerity", a "distrust of experts and expertise", and a lurch towards a revitalised "authoritarian populism". In the UK, much of Europe and the USA, a resurgent "populist anti-political politics" dominates, in which "the super-rich" or "fat cat bankers" enjoy unprecedented levels of deregulated autonomy, benefitting from tax reduction packages whilst reorganised states, directly or through sub-contracting "publicprivate partnerships" coerce, penalise and, often, literally, criminalise those who already bore the brunt of the impacts of austerity policies.
In many sites, loose sets of austerity policies have now solidified into more enduring, long-term, austerity politics, even "austerity polities" or "austerity states" in Jessop's (2016) terms, moving from "exceptional" to "permanent" emergency and, in the process, restructuring, recalibrating and reorienting expenditures, extending the power of finance capital, and finance-dominated accumulation, into "ever wider arenas of social life" (Jessop 2016, 418) . Although variegated "austerity capitalisms" inevitably produce diverse and mutating "macro-institutional frameworks" (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010, 208) or "ensembles" (Peck and Theodore 2007, 762) , imaginaries of austerity link local, national, transnational and global scales, even exploiting differences across regulatory landscapes, resulting in what Jessop has termed "a complex ecology of accumulation regimes, modes of regulation, and spatio-temporal fixes" (Jessop 2010, 6) . Again, this is very much a "peopled" set of imaginaries, whether pushed by the ordo-liberal economic experts discussed by Maesse (this volume), top accountants reproducing and technicising new logics of financialisation noted by Carter and Warren (this volume), the main negotiators of the Troika or the proto-institution of the Eurogroup (Stubbs, this volume), the gurus of "financial literacy" (Žitko, this volume), or the management consultant companies steering urban restructuring (Hurl, this volume).
Reinvigorating knowledge "otherwise"
Although mostly concerned with "what is", the texts which follow are also interested in "what could be", or how a critical moral economy of austerity would need very different kinds of knowledge and expertise from those which currently dominate. "Knowledge otherwise", following Rojas' plea for a "political economy and development otherwise" (Rojas 2007 ) can best be framed as an "ethico-political" (Rojas 2007, 585) or "moral-political" project. Revalidating "alternative knowledges and rationalities" (Clarke et al. 2015, 195) necessitates a move beyond "capitalocentric" expertise (Gibson-Graham 2008) . The critical scholarship we have in mind allows for "empirical encounters and creative expressions of the new, the unthought, the unexpected" (Gibson-Graham 2006, 60) which can, both discursively and practically, "disarm and dislocate the naturalized hegemony" (Gibson-Graham 2006) .
The search for "new articulations of knowledge, power and politics … that have potential for realigning political forces, practices and relationships" (Newman and Clarke, this volume), a kind of "good sense" rather than "commonsense", or what Stubbs (this volume) terms "really useful" or "counter-hegemonic" knowledge, is only touched on in this special issue. A role for "organic intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971) or "public sociology" (Burawoy 2013 ) in transforming and reinvigorating knowledge, expertise and competence in envisioning utopias, be they "everyday utopias" (Cooper 2013) or "real utopias" (Ohlin Wright 2010), through the living of history as "possibility" not as "determinism" (Freire 1998, 102) , underpins and sustains our efforts.
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